Abstract. A Tamed Transformation Method (TTM) cryptosystem was proposed by T.T.Moh in 1999. We describe how the rst implementation scheme of the TTM system can be defeated. The computational complexity of our attack is 2 33 computations on the nite eld with 2 8 elements.
Introduction
During the last twenty years, public key cryptosystems have been developed to become an important part of our modern communication system. A number of di erent authors have constructed multivariable public key cryptosystems { cryptosystems based on multivariable functions instead of single variable functions. The safety of such systems rely on the di culty of solving systems of polynomial equations with many variables. Recently, Matsumoto and Imai MI] proposed a method that was later defeated by Patarin in P] . Another method is the Tamed Transformation Method (TTM) proposed by Moh M] . Goubin and Courtois claimed to have defeated this system in CG], but Chen and Moh refuted this claim in CM] . In this article, we use a completely di erent method to show that the implementation scheme suggested in M] and also the ones suggested in CGC] are not secure. Our approach is inspired by the work of Patarin on the Matsumoto-Imai scheme P].
The basic idea of the TTM systems is that it is computationally di cult to decompose compositions of multi-variable functions. Let K be a eld, let K m = K K K and let F(x 1 ; : : : ; x m ) : K m ! K m be a bijection. Suppose that F(x 1 ; : : : ; x m ) is a composition of several maps i (x 1 ; : : : ; x m ), i = 1; : : : ; k, such that: (I) The function F(x 1 ; : : : ; x m ) can be evaluated quickly and easily for any speci c value of (x 1 ; : : : ; x m ). (II) The i (x 1 ; : : : ; x m ) are individually easy to invert but it is di cult to invert the product F = 1 2 k , without knowing this decomposition. An open key cryptosystem can be established as following: Assume party B intends to send party A a secret message in an open channel.
(1) Party A rst chooses such a pair F(x 1 ; : : : ; x m ) and a eld K.
(2) Party A publicizes the pair, F(x 1 ; : : : ; x m ) and K. One can see that this works in a very similar way as RSA system, except that the security of RSA has nothing to do with property (I) and (II). The security of RSA relies on the di culty of factorizing a product of two primes, pq.
In We show in this article that the code may be defeated in the following fashion. Let x 0 be a plaintext and y 0 = F(x 0 ) be the associated ciphertext. Using particular properties of Q 8 and the q i , we are able to show that there exists a linear subspace of K 64 on which the encryption function F coincides with another function of the form F 0 = 4 0 3 2 1 e where 0 3 is an a ne linear map. In this case F 0 is essentially of de Jonquiere type and can be \inverted". Moreover the nding of the linear subspace, and the construction and inversion of F 0 can all be done in a computationally e cient fashion.
2. Cryptanalysis of the first TTM Scheme Let us begin by reviewing the scheme proposed in M] . From now on, we assume that R is the nite eld with 2 8 elements, which we denote by F 2 8 . The encryption map F is the composition F = 4 3 2 1 e where e : K 64 ! K 100 and the maps i : K 100 ! K 100 , for i = 1; 2; 3; 4 are de ned in the following way.
Let j] = j mod 8, and 0 < j] < 9. De ne 2 = ( 2;1 ; : : : ; 2;100 ) and 3 = ( 3;1 ; : : : ; 3;100 ) to be maps of de 
The rationale for considering V 1 is that the functions S i ^ 2 , T 1 i ^ 2 and T 2 i ^ 2 are all constant on V 1 . This fact is an immediate corollary of the following proposition. Proof. Notice that S 1 ^ 2 (x) = S q 1 (x) = x 4 11 Hence, S 2 6 i ^ 2 (x) = (x 4 11 ) 2 6 = x 11 . But S 2 6 i ^ 21 = S 2 6 i ^ 2 ~ and both S 2 6 i ^ 2 and~ are linear. Hence S 2 6 i ^ 21 2 L. Now 3;1 = x 1 + a 1 3;2 = x 2 + a 2 3;i = x i ; i = 3; : : : ; 100; and let F 0 = 4 0 3 2 1 e. Then F and F 0 coincide on the linear subvariety V containing x 0 . Since F 0 is evidently of de Jonquiere type, we can invert Fj V , using the procedure described below, thereby nding the ciphertext x 0 .
3. The attack procedure and its complexity We perform three steps to derive the plaintext (x 0 1 ; : : : ; x 0 64 ) from the ciphertext (y 0 1 ; : : : ; y 0 100 ). The rst step is a common step for any given ciphertext.
Step 1 of the attack Since the number of equations far exceeds the number of variables, we do not need to use all of the equations to nd the solution. In practice we can randomly choose 8000 equations; the probability that we will not nd the complete solution is essentially zero. Solving these linear equations, involves row operations on an 8000 5215 matrix. However, because we are working over a nite eld with only 2 8 elements, the row operations corresponding to each column requires at most 2 8 ?1 multiplication of any given row. Elimination of each variable takes, on average, (2 8 ? 1) 8000=2 multiplications. Therefore the solution of these equations requires at most 5215 (2 8 ? 1) 8000=2 : = 2 33 computations on the nite eld K. Moreover this step is independent of the value of the ciphertext y 0 Because we are working over the xed eld K, we can perform the computation of multiplication on K by rst nding a generator g of the multiplicative group of K, storing the table of elements of K in the form g k , then computing the multiplication by two searches and one addition. This will improve the speed by at least a factor of 2. Thus, this preliminary step takes at most 2 32 computations.
Step 2 of the attack
Step 1 For a given ciphertext (y 0 1 ; ::; y 0 100 ), we substitute these values into the right hand side to derive a set of linear equations in x i . Solving this system by Gaussian elimination enables us to eliminate a certain set of, say, s x i 's by expressing them as linear expressions in the remaining variables. We may then substitute these expressions into the y i to produce a new set of functions,ỹ i for i = 1; : : : ; 100, in the remaining 64 ? m variables.
This process corresponds to the identi cation as a vector space of the linear subvariety V 1 described in the previous section.
Step 3 in the unknownsã i ;b i ;c j andd. We then repeat the procedure of step 2. Each element of this basis yields an equation of this form into which we can again substitute the ciphertext. this gives a system of linear equations, which we can again solve to eliminate a further set of saym variables. Substituting for these variables in theỹ i ,ŷ i .
For the rst part, the number of variables is 301 and the number of equations is 3 ((64 ? m)(64 ? m + 3)=2 < 5307. The computation in this step takes no signi cant time compared to that of Step 1.
The span of the remaining x i 's forms a vector space that we are identifying naturally with the linear subspace V described above. We now proceed to \invert" Fj V . Since this map is essentially of de Jonquiere type, this procedure is fairly standard. We aim to solve the system of polynomial equationsŷ i ? y 0 i = 0. Since the map Fj V is of de Jonquiere type, the vector space spanned by the polynomial functionsŷ i ? y 0 i intersects L nontrivially; i.e., it contains a linear function of the x i . This enables us to substitute for one of the x i 's, thereby reducing the number of variables. The nature of a function of de Jonquiere type, then enables us to iterate this process.
Step 4 of the attack
We now proceed to \invert" Fj V . Since this map is essentially of de Jonquiere type, this procedure is fairly standard. We aim to solve the system of polynomial equationsŷ i ? y 0 i = 0. The problem is to solve the system of equations y 0 i = F i (x 1 ; : : : ; x 64 ). We know there exists a set of polynomials G j such that the solution is given by x j = G j (y 0 1 ; : : : ; y 0 100 ). The standard method of attack is to look for polynomials G j (y 1 ; : : : ; y 100 ) of low degree. However, this is often impossible. Instead we search for low degree polynomials G j such that G j (y 2 6 1 ; : : : ; y 2 6 100 ) produces linear combinations of the x i .
Recently a family of versions of the functions Q 8 with much higher degrees was described in CGC]. These again decompose into terms analogous to the S, T 1 and T 2 above and hence can be defeated by an analogous approach. Thus the security of such systems depends crucially on the construction of the function that plays the role of Q 8 .
We do not, however, claim that all such Q 8 -type implementations make the system insecure. For example, a new suggestion in CM] seems very di erent and we can not directly apply our method in this situation. However even for this case, it is possible that an extention of our method further could succeed in defeating this more complicated system.
The web site of the US Data Security poses a number of challenges concerning the TTM cryptosystem. Professor Moh informed us that the scheme defeated in this article is essentially Learner's Challenge I in the web site. In order to defeat this challenge we need to rst nd the functions y i . Since these are not given explicitly, this requires the encoding of thousands of plaintexts. Because of the limited access to the cipher, we have not yet been able to compute the y i explicitly.
